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Aristotle is sometimes called the “Father of natural law”. 
But in name and fundamental meaning natural law originated 
early in Greek thought from what the Greeks saw, or thought they 
saw, in the universe—the working of a divine mind ordering every­
thing into a harmony. The Homeric epics refer to a law older than 
the decrees of the Olympian gods; to an ancient sacred order which 
was recognized long before the authority of Zeus and the Olympian 
gods was established. This most ancient law, the basis of kin 
society, is the Themis. It is Themis, for example, to honour one’s 
parents, to practice hospitality, to bury the dead, not to kill a 
kindred person, or to indulge in a blood feud. But Themis is not 
only a pre-Olympian concept of what is “right”, it is also a cosmic 
force which watches over the “right”. Themis is Fate. As Moira, 
the goddess, Themis personifies the belief in a preordained destiny 
in which man’s life is inextricably enmeshed.
Much later, the mythology of Plato has Zeus giving men, and 
men only, the dike (justice) which keeps them from destroying 
each other. Political justice for Plato exists when each class in the 
state performs the function appropriate to its abilities without inter­
fering with the appropriate functioning of other classes— all under 
the direction of a governing class, the characteristic virtue of which 
is wisdom. Personal justice in the Platonic ethics is similarly 
structured, with each faculty of the individual independently ful­
filling its proper function ideally under the direction of an intellect 
endowed with wisdom.
The following elements of this conception of justice, in con­
junction with the Greek constant of divine law, were taken into 
Aristotle’s political theory, and constitute the basis of his meaning 
of natural law:
1. That things (not only human beings, and their faculties, but 
all natural things) can be known to be of a certain kind.
2. Because a thing is of a certain kind, reason can determine:
3. What the proper function of that thing is, and
4. What purpose or end that function should achieve.
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5. That God is essentially involved in natural functioning to achieve 
a natural end, because only by the attraction of divine perfection 
is anything moved to function naturally.
For Aristotle, and for those philosophers who have followed 
him, everything has the general purpose of perfecting itself, that 
is, of realizing the totality of its possibilities. But it is the peculiar 
power, and responsibility, of intelligent beings (men) to discover 
what their own proper possibilities are by an examination of their 
own common nature, their own inclinations, and to reason out the 
ways in which these possibilities can best be actualized.
From this viewpoint it seemed evident to Aristotle, for 
example, that by the natural law man is a social animal, that some 
men are bom slaves (or “living implements”), that the purpose 
of the state is paramount to the purpose of any individual citizen.
From what man is, then, it is possible, according to this 
theory, to reason to what his conduct, public or private, ought to 
be. And the conclusions man reasonably comes to about what his 
conduct ought to be constitute natural law.
Put very simply, the transition from the is to the ought, from 
fact to value, in the Aristotelian conception of natural law is the 
same as occurs in the situation where a man’s reasonable purpose 
is to get up on the roof of his house, and he considers the means 
of getting there as either good or bad. In such a consideration, of 
course, more than the man’s nature, the kind of operations he can 
perform, must be taken into account. Some thought must be 
given to the apparatus available and also (perhaps above all), 
to the people who are going to help him—it is amazing how 
distracted most people become when they have the responsibility 
of steadying the foot of an extension ladder. It is apparent that 
even a limited operation such as getting up on a roof is seldom 
simple, and it is unnecessary to emphasize that social enterprises 
are generally extremely complex. It would be a mistake therefore 
to assume that the natural law is ever responsibly proposed as 
source of instaht precepts.
A point to be noted before we leave Aristotle is that the 
natural law, as he conceives it, is a moral law. It demands that 
a man be reasonable, but it permits him to be totally unreasonable 
if he so desires. The unreasonable man has only the consequences 
of irrationality to suffer—he will end up less a man, he will not 
have fulfilled his possibilities. He ought to fulfill these possibilities, 
but nothing in the natural law will compel that realization.
The Roman Stoic conception of natural law (which is basic 
to Roman Law) is ultimately, however, not a moral law, but
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rather a physical law. The Universe, as the Stoics understood 
it, is governed by a “World Reason”, which may simply be called 
“Fate”. This “Fate” positively orders everything, including man, 
into universal harmony. The only freedom peculiar to man is to 
co-operate or refuse to co-operate with “Fate”. If he co-operates, 
if he is reasonable, he is happy. If he refuses to co-operate, if he 
attempts to oppose his “Fate”, he is miserable— but it all comes 
out the same in the end. Willy-nilly he does what the natural law 
demands. This law in Stoic theory is, therefore, a physical law, 
a law of coercion, with a mere minimum of moral free-play to 
account for happiness and misery in human life.
It may be noted that the Stoics eliminated Plato’s and 
Aristole’s distinction between free man and slave. For them the 
only distinction in the world community is between the wise man 
who goes along quietly with the forces of the natural law and the 
fool who struggles against them. Hence the oft-quoted lines of 
Seneca: “The gods do bless the man who follows willing, the man 
who is unwilling him they drag”.
It seems generally taken for granted in political histories that 
there is no difference between the Roman Stoic conception of 
natural law and that erf theologians and philosophers of the Middle 
Ages. There is no doubt, erf course, that the latter borrowed 
extensively from the Stoics. But I think it is worth pointing out 
that Christian natural law, if the expression is admissible, is, like 
Aristotle’s, a moral law. If a man disobeys the natural law in a 
serious way Christian theology sees him in danger of missing his 
proper final end and going to Hell; but nothing can force him 
along the road to Hell—or along the road to Heaven, for that 
matter.
Is the distinction between the Stoic and Christian conceptions 
of the working out of natural law of any considerable importance? 
Speculatively it would seem that the conception of a world force 
pushing one along a path of destiny could scarcely fail to 
encourage an individualism of an anti-social sort. If a man to be 
happy must follow his own unique way through life then he can 
scarcely be expected to cede much to the needs of others. 
Practically it is interesting to note that those countries which were 
within the pale of Roman law with its Stoic philosophical basis 
have never in any durable way been able to make parliamentary 
democracy work. The notion of absolute rights belonging to 
individuals as such seems in contradiction to the spirit of com­
promise necessary for the successful functioning of parliaments, 
particularly in that it seems always to engender ah atomic “bloc”
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system within parliaments rather than party systems of the 
English kind. At any rate, countries which have constructed their 
political forms in the English mode have succeeded rather well in 
maintaining stable parliamentary governments, a!nd the fact is that 
England with its common law and canon law tradition was never 
within the pale of Roman Law.
In discussing natural law in the Medieval period, I must for 
reasons of time and my own limitations, ignore the Canon and 
Civil lawyers generally and concern myself only with two of 
the most representative theologians— St. Thomas Aquinas and 
William of Ockham. But to appreciate the difference in viewpoint 
of these two, it may be useful to say a word about St. Augustine 
who influenced a movement of thought which penetrated the 
thinking of the whole of the Middle Ages, pro or con, and who is 
still, and I think increasingly, of significant influence among 
Catholic theologians and philosophers.
Augustine was a Neo-Platonist philosophically, and from 
Plato he obtained the conviction that the eternal truth is not 
attained by examining things in the world. We see the truth in 
our own ways of thinking and we are therefore bom possessing 
the truth. Furthermore, with Plato, Augustine held that a grasp 
of the truth is but a stage on the way to the knowledge of the 
good. Now for St. Augustine it is the will which knows the good; 
the intellect merely knows the truth— a lesser value. Therefore 
the will is superior to the intellect. From this evaluation there 
spread down the Middle Ages a tendency to exalt the will, both 
divine and human, and to emphasize the freedom of the will as 
God’s and man’s most precious attribute. What all this has to do 
with law, I hope will become clear later.
I think it is safe to say that the influence of Augustine 
predominated throughout the Middle Ages until St. Thomas 
established, temporarily at least, the predominance of Aristotle 
over Plato— a predominance I must hasten to add, which was 
never recognized by a large and influential school of medieval 
theologians and philosophers— and which is recognized today— 
perhaps alas— by a dwindling number of influential thinkers in the 
Catholic church. Among the medieval legal theorists who was 
not influenced by Aristotle was William of Ockham, about whom 
I will say something later.
The philosopher for St. Thomas Aquinas is Aristotle. His 
respect for St. Augustine, as a member of the same union of 
saints, never diminished his Aristotelian conviction that reason is 
prior and superior to will. Nor did his acquaintance with Roman
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Law, particularly through the writings of Isadore of Seville, move 
him to relinquish the Aristotelian conception of the natural law 
as a moral law in favour of the natural positivism of the Stoics. 
For St. Thomas, therefore, law was always and in all forms 
primarily and essentially a rule of reason and only incidentally an 
expression of the will of the lawmaker.
So we find Aquinas giving a definition to include all law 
whatsoever in the following terms: Law, he wrote, is an ordinance 
of reason for the common good promulgated by him who has care 
of the community.
This insistence of Aquinas upon reason as the source of law 
follows from his view that it is the function of reason to direct 
man in the achievement of human purposes. Will is involved in 
this finding of means to end only secondarily because the will 
ought to be moved by reason and reason only. The will of the 
sovereign, he says, has the force of law but unless the sovereign's 
will is in accordance with reason it savours of lawlessness. He 
expresses the same notion in another way when he says that the 
form of government called tyranny is an absolutely unreasonable 
institution and therefore can have no law.
The other elements in Aquinas’ definition of law need little 
explanation. The provision that law must serve the common good 
means simply that its purpose is the happiness of all members of 
the community and not the welfare of any individual or particular 
class. That law must be promulgated follows from its rational 
nature, wherein there is essentially no coercion. Men are 
expected to obey the law because it is reasonable, but to recognize 
its reasonableness they have to know it first. By the provision 
that the application of law must be made by him who has care of 
the community, St. Thomas explicitly states that he means the 
whole community (as in direct democracy) or else the vice-regent 
of the whole community.
Within his definition Aquinas distinguished four types of law, 
which taken all together constitute a system of divine government 
over the whole cosmos, and which regulate the relationships 
between creatures within the universal order.
An unlawful ruler, or one who makes bad laws, was, for 
Aquinas, a rebel against God and the whole divine plan for the 
world, since each one of the four kinds of law is a form of the 
ordinance of divine laws in governing a level of cosmic reality.
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The highest law, and the matrix of all law in the scheme of 
Aquinas is the Eternal Law: another name for the reason of God. 
It is the model or idea of the universe in the divine intellect. It is 
divine wisdom. Human ideas, St. Thomas says, are derived from 
things, and things, including man, are derived from the divine 
ideas.
All other laws including human laws must conform to the 
eternal law. Insofar as they deviate from it they are unjust and 
partake not of the nature of law but of violence. Through this 
Eternal Law God imprints on the whole of nature the principle 
of its proper functions, and this He does in two ways:
(1) by an inward moving principle— a nature—which gives to 
things their innate inclinations;
(2) by way of knowledge. Man is subject to the eternal law in 
both ways. He is a material body subject, for example, to 
the law of gravity. He is an animal subject to instinctual 
drives. But he is also a rational creature capable of assessing 
and choosing means to fulfill his God-given functions.
The second form of law in the scheme of Aquinas is Divine 
Law. It heed not detain us because it belongs to the supernatural 
order. Briefly it is contained in the old and new testaments and 
in the teachings of the Church. It directs man to his eternal 
happiness rather than to happiness in this world.
Aquinas’ third form of law is natural law. It is the partici­
pation of man in the eternal law through his nature, with all its 
tendencies towards self-perfective activities. As has been sug­
gested these tendencies are of various levels but all are directed 
towards the good, that is, towards whatever will perfect the 
human individual and the human species. In common with all 
other beings whatever, man desires his own cultural existence— 
hence the natural law of the preservation of human life. With all 
ahimals, he shares the mating instinct, and a concern for the 
education of offspring, etc. Peculiar to man, however, are the 
inclinations to live in society and to accomplish what is necessary 
to make human society possible, such as the avoidance of offence 
to those with whom he lives, and so on.
In short all man’s appetites are a part of the natural law but 
it is the particular function of reason to rule these appetites ahd 
to employ them as a means to the attainment of his individual 
perfection and, through society, the perfection of his species.
The natural law, so conceived, is unchangeable in its general 
basic principles but in its remote applications, as deduced from 
these basic principles, chaiige is possible. Unfortunately Aquinas
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gives no examples of the kind of changes he thought to be possible 
but because the idea of change in the natural law is of peculiar 
interest theologically at the present time and consequently of 
concern to those who see a necessary connection betwen theology 
and human law, I would like to include here a quotation from 
Aquinas: “In its secondary principles which are certain detailed 
proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural 
law is not changed so that what it prescribes is not right in most 
cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare 
occurence through some special causes hindering the observance 
of such precepts”.
As to knowledge of the natural law by all men, St. Thomas 
says that all know the common principles but concerning the 
more remote precepts there is greater possibility of error, e.g., he 
says, stealing, at one time, was not considered wrong among the 
Germans.
Now, because of the possibility of error about the natural 
law in particular cases, because the natural law does not supply 
definite rules for application to all human situations, and because 
the fear of punishment is required to compel perverse individuals 
to avoid actions harmful to the common good, there is need for 
Aquinas’ fourth kind of ia w , human law.
This kind of law according to St. Thomas has two divisions, 
civil law (Ius Civile— not necessarily so called in distinction from 
common law) and the law of nature (the Ius Gentium of the 
Roman lawyers). It supplements natural law in the ways already 
mentioned but particularly by making the natural law definite 
and concrete, e.g., the latter forbids murder but does not specify 
what kinds of homicide are to be considered as murder.
All human law without exception, however, is ultimately 
derived from the natural law. This is a departure from Aristotle’s 
view which saw the two as independent and even in opposition in 
some cases. But Aquinas holds that law is a law only if it is just, 
and a law is just only insofar as it is reasonable. Now as the first 
rule of practical reason is the natural law, all law must be based 
upon the natural law.
St. Thomas’ theory of natural law may be called the intel- 
lectualist theory. William of Ockham’s theory, to which I now turn, 
is commonly called the voluntarist theory, simply because it insists 
that law is not essentially a matter of reason but rather of will. 
First of all, Ockham denies that God has ideas— being absolutely 
a unity there could be no multiplicity in his nature, not even of 
ideas. Now if there are no ideas in his intellect God could not
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have employed ideas as his models in creating the universe. Hence, 
the way things are in the world is the result simply of a completely 
free, one might say arbitrary, divine covenant—an action of the 
divine will purely and simply. By way of contrast, then, we may 
say that Aquinas held that God promulgated the external, divine 
and natural laws because they are reasonable, and Ockham held 
that these laws are reasonable because God promulgated them.
Furthermore Ockham saw that if he was right in saying that 
God employed no models in the artistic creation of the Universe, 
then there are no essences or natures common to classes of things— 
everything is uniquely individual. Hence there is no point in trying 
to discover what is natural to classes of things such as men and 
establishing one’s discoveries as laws. It is true, Ockham argued, 
that there is a natural law, but man discovers it not in things and 
their relations but in the universal principles which the human 
intellect formulates independently of his knowledge of the indi­
vidual things which make up the universe.
Hence Ockham saw no difficulty in the proposition that 
murder, adultery, even hatred of God would cease to be evil and 
become entirely good if God commanded such actions.
What is important for our purpose here is that more than 
one authority subscribes to the view that the voluntarist theory 
of natural law encouraged legal positivism in its definition of law 
as the command of the sovereign. They point out that some of 
Ockham’s followers, if not Ockham himself, extended his definition 
of natural law to encompass all law, so that, as one of the fol­
lowers, Pierre d’Ailly, said, “The Prince is bound by no (human) 
law, not even that which he makes himself”. In other words, 
although a government would be bound by the law of God, in 
the silence of that law there could be no criterion of right or 
reasonableness applicable to laws proclaimed by that government. 
They would be laws and equal in status to any other human law 
simply because the legislator commanded their observance. This 
view is certainly attributable to Jean Bodin (late 16th Century) 
who considered himself the father of the idea of sovereignty, as 
it also may be to the 14th century school of positivistic Roman 
lawyers of which Bodin considered himself a descendant.
Despite the difficulty of definitely tracing judicial practice to 
jurisprudential theory exposed in a theological context, as was 
Ockham’s theory of natural law, it is considered significant by 
some historians of jurisprudence that in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
even in England, the home of common law, the claims of parlia­
ment were met by strong counter-claims of royal absolutism of a
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kind unknown in the high Middle Ages. A case which is cited to 
illustrate these absolutist counter-claims in England is the Bates 
case. The facts of this taxation action are not of importance here, 
but the Chief Justice (actually the chief Baron) stated in his 
decision that the King “has an overriding absolute prerogative to 
deal with matters of state”, “a general absolute prerogative to act 
as he pleased, which he could use whenever he saw fit, the ordinary 
(royal power) is for the profit of particular subjects, for the 
execution of civil justice, the determining of the ‘mine’ . . . and 
by the civilians is nominated jus privatum and with us common 
law; and these laws cannot be changed without parliament . . . 
the absolute (royal) power is not to the benefit of any particular 
person, but is only that which is applied to the general benefit of 
the people, and is salus populi; as the people is the body and the 
King the head”.
This is considered to be a new distinction in English law, 
although it is suggested by the contemporaneous teaching erf the 
professor of civil law at Oxford who referred back for his authority 
to the 14th century Roman lawyer Baldus, a contemporary of 
Ockham.
I don’t wish to suggest that anyone holds Ockham personally 
responsible for all the positivistic theories of law since his time, 
or for royal absolutism and all that goes with it. One would be 
rather inclined to think that the seeds of Augustinianism had 
flowered in the 14th century fields of theological jurisprudence 
which in turn had seeded the political terrain. But even those who 
see this relationship admit that it is difficult to document and it is 
indeed denied by some authorities. The coincidences, however, 
seem really too great to be simply coincidences. As a further 
example, four years after the Bates case (in 1610) James 1st of 
England proclaimed in a speech delivered to parliament that the 
King is accountable to God alone and argued that “if you will con­
sider the attributes of God, you will see how they agree in the 
person of the King”. In other words, as God is absolutely free to 
command his subjects to do whatever He wills, so kings are free 
even, as James actually said, “to make of their subjects like men 
at chess”.
It would be possible to go on for some time tracing the 
influence of the voluntarist theory of natural law through later 
theologians to political and legal action. Suffice it to say that the 
great Jesuit political philosopher Suarez subscribed largely to it, 
and he had considerable effect on Spanish law as applied at home 
and in the colonies of Spain. Among the protestant theologians
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Luther, Calvin and Zwingli were Ockhamists—which no doubt 
had at least something to do with the views of these men con­
cerning the powers of civil rulers.
But I am sure you have had enough of the theological founda­
tions of natural law theory and I am going to turn now, briefly, to 
what is called modem natural law, then consider some post-modern 
objections, and possible answers to these objections.
In the early 17th century a process was begun of gradually 
releasing political and legal philosophy from its age-long associa­
tion with theology. With the Renaissance the secularization of 
intellectual interests had begun with its attendant features of 
naturalism (as opposed to supematuralism) and rationalism (as 
opposed to theological faith). The special sciences begin to domi­
nate all fields of scholarship with their special kind of logic.
Prominent in the political thinking of the post-Renaissance 
period was the social contract theory of the foundation of govern­
ment— a theory which attributed practically nothing to religious 
authority in any sense of the term. Here may be mentioned 
Althusius who attributed to a contract between members of a 
political community a two-fold effect: it founded the community, 
and established a government to administer the affairs of that 
community. The important effect of this theory was that it made 
sovereignty reside necessarily and inseparably in the people as a 
corporate body and limited that sovereignty by human law only.
This detachment of natural law from divine authority was 
completed by Hugo Grotius who was not as clear about national 
sovereignty as Althusius but who went beyond the latter in his 
conception of a law regulating the relations between sovereign 
states. With a divided Christendom to deal with, Grotius went 
back to the Stoic philosophy of natural law—to the trend called 
“sociableness” as apparent in the very nature of man. Grotius 
still talked about God as the author of nature, as did Althusius, 
but made it clear that the laws of nature would be unchanged if, 
by hypothesis, there were no God.
Grotius, however, gave a meaning to reason as the source 
of natural law which is not found in the theories of antiquity. 
Legal reasoning appeared as analogous to mathematical reason­
ing— and the basic legal maxims as axioms erf the 2 +  2 =  4 
kind, the truth of which is guaranteed by their self-evidence. 
Grotius wanted to do for law what he thought was being done for 
physics by Galileo. The important jurisprudential consideration 
for Grotius was a good method, and in the spirit of his time, and
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much later, the best method was that by which the mathematical 
sciences were applied to nature— a conviction which many would 
agree is still too much with us.
The mode of procedure of Thomas Hobbes in the middle of 
the 17th Century was much in accordance with that of Hugo 
Grotius but the results were considerably different. Grotius con­
ceived the law of nature as directed to human purposes. Hobbes 
thought of the law as a mechanical principle. He dispensed with 
the idea of purpose altogether and thought in terms of forces— 
chiefly psychological—and their effects. Jurisprudence for him 
was part of a mechanistic body of scientific knowledge, and it is 
important to note that the basic fact of nature around which this 
body was constructed was the force of individual self-interest.
The social contract theories of Althusius, Grotius and 
Hobbes, the Robinson-Crusoe-like state of nature which was 
presumed to have preceeded the social contract, and the force of 
individualism which moved men in Hobbe’s conception to negoti­
ate and abide by the contract, had their most influential exposition 
in the natural law theory of John Locke. According to the latter, 
on the free individual rests a single law—the law of nature—with 
a single precept—that of self-preservation, the preservation of 
one’s own life, liberty and property. This law has only one 
limitation— the same law as binding other individuals, who in 
their equally sovereign independence are likewise bound to 
preserve themselves, their liberty and their property. If the 
preservation of other individuals could be considered an added 
duty for Locke, it came into effect only insofar as it did not 
diminish each individual's own self-interest. The “common good”, 
which he holds to be a limitation of governmental power, consists 
merely in the security of each individual in the possession of his 
property. It may easily be seen that Locke’s law of nature, his 
rights of man, the origins of society he postulates, are not derived 
from reality, from man’s nature as it really is in its totality. They 
are deduced from abstractions, a fictitious state of nature (a 
myth) and a disembodied notion of man according to which 
material possessions are the only objects of human desire.
The common sense and common law practicality of the 
English prevented Locke’s theories from having any devastating 
social consequences in the British Isles. But the French, with 
their passion for abstractions (La Gloire of De Gaulle), and 
their individualism as derived from Roman Law Stoic philosophy, 
went for Locke’s ideas “whole hog”. Hence the complete atomic 
individualism erf the Constitution of 1791 and of the Declaration
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of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Locke’s individualism provides 
no room for equity in law but merely a pattern of power relation­
ships— the absolute lordship of one individual battling against the 
equally absolute lordship of others. In this pattern the legislator 
is the arbiter of “right” only in the sense that it has the power to 
check power. Majority rule for Locke is simply “the greater force”.
In such a theory there is of course the seed of legal posi­
tivism— might makes right— and the foundation of any sort of 
political absolutism anybody likes.
Within the period of Locke’s influence, (which was much 
greater than I have been able to indicate), natural law decayed, 
and David Hume is supposed to have destroyed it completely. 
However, in recent years there has been a notable revival of 
interest in the theory of natural law in its ancient and medieval 
forms. No doubt the history of the first half of this century has 
afforded a powerful impetus to the search for a less sterile and 
less dangerous theory of law than that professed by the legal 
positivists. The atrocities of this era, the deliberate mass starva­
tions in Stalinist Russia, the genocide attempts by the Nazis with 
their gas ovens, the terror of the nuclear bomb— so many events 
evidencing the capacity of man to be irrational to a terrifying 
degree, have moved jurisprudence to seek an alternative to 
positivism. The natural law theory is an alternative.
I need scarcely remind this class that when the allied power 
sought a legal ground for the Nuremberg war crimes trials, Judge 
Robert Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court, their prosecuting 
representative, could find none except the natural law; and if the 
more recent Declaration of the Rights of Man made by the 
United Nations is not founded upon a natural law basis, it would 
be difficult to find any other for it.
This theory is, however, not capturing the field of ethical 
jurisprudence by storm. It has powerful opponents. Foremost 
among them are the philosophical positivists who accept as true 
only the mathematical certitude of the sciences, and the kind 
of certitude which is based upon logical contradiction (e.g., 
Descartes Cogito Ergo Sum).
But as Aristotle pointed out over 20 centuries ago, we can 
only attain that degree of certitude in any science which the com­
plexity of the facts of that science permits; and in the prac­
tical sciences we cannot hope to arrive at the certitude which 
mathematics and formal logic afford. Jurisprudence is of course 
a practical science and its findings will never be as certain as the 
axiom that one and one equals two or that the whole of any 
material thing is greater than any one of its parts.
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The basic objection of the philosophical positivists to a moral 
natural law is that logically a statement of fact cannot be con­
verted into a statement erf obligation; an “is” cannot be converted 
into an “ought”. To go back to our original analogy of the mail 
wanting to get up on his roof, the positivistic philosopher will 
object that the fact that the man is wanting to get up on his roof 
cannot establish an obligation to get up on the roof. If we say: 
Well, if he wants to erect a television antenna he is obliged to 
get up on the roof, the rejoinder is that the fact of his desire to 
have satisfactory T.V. reception doesn’t imply that he “ought” to 
satisfy that desire. To anyone who may say that to desire good 
T.V. reception is reasonable the answer is: there is no obligation 
to be reasonable.
These philosophers say that the natural law theory results 
from a confusion of logical statement forms wherein the question 
“What is man for” is confused with the question “What is the 
light switch for”. The latter question can be answered, they point 
out, because General Electric or someone made the light switch 
to serve a function. But the question “What is man for” cannot 
have an answer because mail was not made by anyone— and 
consequently was not made to serve a function. I can almost hear 
you thinking: Now comes the commercial: He is going to insist 
that God made us, and did indeed make us for a purpose which, 
as far as this world is concerned, is evident in man’s nature— iii 
the kind of thing he is.
And I am—but I am not going to preach a sermon or hold 
catechism class.
I agree with Jean Paul Sartre in very few things, but I think 
he is absolutely right when he says that you cannot deny the 
existence of a Creator and still make sense out of this world. He 
says that, if the world, and man, were not made by an intelligent 
being, then this world is absurd. He thinks it is absurd. I thiink 
his conclusion follows from his premises. Nietzche said “God is 
dead and everything is permitted”. If God is indeed dead, then 
indeed everything is permitted. All the greatest thinkers I have 
any familiarity with agree in this, at least, that if there is no 
eternal rewarder of virtue then no man can be expected to be 
concerned with the distinction between moral good and evil, at 
least insofar as the effect of good and evil upon others is concerned.
The Thomist natural law protagonists say that God equipped 
man with the faculty of reason and expects him to use it. The 
positivistic philosophers say no one equipped man with his facul­
ties, and he has no obligation to use any of them—not even his 
reason.
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That in a nutshell is the chief battle which natural law 
exponents have to fight and, I think, have to win, if the civilizing 
function of law is to long endure. It might be objected that we 
are now livihg in a secularized, godless world without benefit of 
the natural law mentality and we are not doing too badly. Even 
if it can be conceded that we are not doing too badly, I think, 
nevertheless, that it can fairly be claimed that we are living on 
the moral capital of ages which were not godless, or secularized 
or deprived of natural law jurisprudence. It is not ihsignificant 
that a man can be dying in a ditch in China or India and 
passers-by will not even turn their head to look at him. I do not 
mean to suggest that if people would only read the Summa 
Theologica of St. Thomas the world’s troubles would be ended. 
It takes more than knowledge to make meh good—Plato to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Nor even if virtue were knowledge 
would a knowledge of Medieval natural law be adequate to solve 
the jurisprudential problems of our times. Conditions change, 
knowledge of men and things increases, and meh must grow in 
wisdom and grace to organize and use their knowledge to suit 
the conditions.
By way of example, it is often charged that Medieval natural 
law is too authoritarian, that it allows too little to that unique 
freedom which is everyman. The modem persOnalist, and par­
ticularly the existentialists, have been stressing the right of man to 
freedom; and I think they do well to stress it. But if the human 
tendency towards freedom was insufficiently appreciated in the 
Medieval natural law theory that need merely mean that this 
theory was inadequate— it does not imply that the theory was 
entirely wrong. If every man is unique, then man is naturally 
unique; if every man needs a maximum of freedom, then it may 
be argued that it is of the nature of man to be free.
The only precaution one would enjoin here is the avoidance 
of a partial view of man. To define man as consciousness and to 
point out the absolute freedom of consciousness is to ignore the 
fact that man is more than consciousness. He is a conscious body, 
which as a body is as subject to the limitations imposed by the 
coexistence of other bodies as any other material thing in nature. 
Jean-Paul Sartre made this mistake in definition in his early writ­
ings with the result that when he came to deal with social prob­
lems he ended up by defecting from Existentialism to Marxism.
If we would make as great an effort to grasp the totality of 
human tendencies, to understand the purposes to which these 
tendencies lead, and the ways they can be reconciled, as we are
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presently making to understand material things and the ways they 
can be employed to gratify man’s restless appetite for diversion, 
then I think natural law theory could be to human law and govern­
ment a light to illuminate the darkness which so many observers 
fear to be now gradually enveloping the world.
I cannot end on such a gloomy note, so let me add that it 
seems to me that men are following natural law principles to make 
gains for mankind. Never in the history of mankind has there 
been such a hatred of war, a horror of disease, a compassion for 
suffering, a concern for human freedom as is evident today in 
those countries in which there is still a strong tradition of Greek 
and Christian thought. I cannot suggest that these attitudes are 
entirely due to the natural law elements in that thought—Christ 
was not a natural law theorist—but wherever reason rather than, 
or along with, faith has had an influence in forming these 
attitudes, the natural law has had its effect.
